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Abstract. Homoglyphs can be used for disguising plagiarized text by
replacing letters in source texts with visually identical letters from other
scripts. Most current plagiarism detection systems are not able to detect
plagiarism when text has been obfuscated using homoglyphs. In this
work, we present two alternative approaches for detecting plagiarism in
homoglyph obfuscated texts. The first approach utilizes the Unicode list
of confusables to replace homoglyphs with visually identical letters, while
the second approach uses a similarity score computed using normalized
hamming distance to match homoglyph obfuscated words with source
words. Empirical testing on datasets from PAN-2015 shows that both
approaches perform equally well for plagiarism detection in homoglyph
obfuscated texts.
1 Introduction
The notion of ‘Disguised Plagiarism’ refers to a class of methods used for inten-
tionally hiding text that has been copied [8]. Furthermore, ‘Technical Disguise’
is a particular form of disguised plagiarism, wherein obfuscation techniques are
used in order to evade the detection of plagiarized text by changing the compu-
tational representation of text. An important method for technically disguising
text is to substitute characters visually identical to other characters in some
other script (i.e., homoglyphs) [5]. For example, the Latin character ‘p’ (Uni-
code U+160) and the Cyrillic ‘p’ (Unicode U+0440) have identical glyphs but
distinct Unicode values, making the words ‘paypal’ and ‘paypal’ appear identical
to a human evaluator, but undetectable to an automated plagiarism detection
system that has not been designed to deal with such changes. In tests of sev-
eral leading plagiarism detection systems most were unable to detect similarities
between source and plagiarized texts obfuscated using homoglyphs [7, 12].
In this work we present two alternate approaches for plagiarism detection in
homoglyph obfuscated texts: (1) by using the Unicode list of ‘confusables’ to find
and replace homoglyphs with visually identical ASCII letters; and (2) by using
a measure of similarity based on normalized hamming distance to match homo-
glyph obfuscated words with source words. Our work shows both approaches per-
form equally well for detecting plagiarism in homoglyph obfuscated texts. Both
approaches have their particular advantages and limitations and may therefore
be applicable in specific application scenarios in homoglyph obfuscated texts.
2 Related Work
Homoglyph substitution has been used as part of standard tests for plagiarism
detection systems. For example, Gillam et al. [5] used homoglyph substitution
as an obfuscation strategy for testing plagiarism detection systems. Their results
demonstrated that six out of seven plagiarism detection systems were unable to
detect any similarity between source and substituted text. Figure 1 gives a list
of characters used in their work, with the number of instances of each character
visually detected by human evaluators stated as well. In the annual ‘Plagiarism
Detection Software Test’ by Weber Wulff et al. [12], 13 out of 15 plagiarism
detection systems failed to report any similarity between a given text source
and its homoglyph substituted version.
Fig. 1. Replacement Letters for Visually Similar Characters from [5]
Heather et. al [6] describe a variety of techniques for technically disguising
plagiarized text, which include: modifying the character map, rearranging the
glyphs in fonts, replacing text with graphical symbols, and inserting characters
in background (white) font between words. Kakoneen and Mozgovoy [7] also
discuss a number of ‘technical tricks’ that can be used to obfuscate texts, in-
cluding: (1) the insertion of similar looking characters from foreign alphabets
(homoglyph substitution); (2) the insertion of background colored characters in
between spaces; and (3) the use of scanned images in place of text. According to
their results, “None of the evaluated systems were able to detect any instances
of plagiarism from the documents.”
In addition to text obfuscation during plagiarism, homoglyphs have also been
used in IDN (Internationalized Domain Name) homograph attacks1 used to di-
rect users towards alternative websites. With such an attack, users could be
directed towards the website ‘paypal.com’ which is a Cyrillic substituted version
of the Latin ‘paypal.com’. Existing approaches to deal with IDN homoglyph at-
tacks include: (1) Punycode [3] that converts non-ASCII characters into ASCII
characters irreversibly (e.g., G´oog´le is converted to the ASCII ‘xn–oole-ksbc’);
(2) coloring-based strategies that distinguish homoglyphs by assigning various
colors to foreign script characters [13]; and (3) a Unicode character similarity
list (UC-SimList) [4] to detect homoglyphs in URLs. Some of these approaches
might not be useful for plagiarism detection e.g. Punycode results in loss of in-
formation, and coloring requires visual inspection. However, the idea of using a
list of Unicode equivalents for detecting IDN homograph attacks can be utilized
for plagiarism detection in homoglyph obfuscated texts.
1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IDN_homograph_attack
3 Methodology
3.1 Resources
The Unicode List of Confusable Characters. Several lists of homoglyph-
alphabet pairs are freely available (e.g., homoglyphs.net). The Unicode consor-
tium has released a list of confusables, which is a list of visually similar character
pairs that includes homoglyphs and their corresponding Latin letters [1]. We use
Version 9.0.0 of the list of confusables containing 6167 pairs of confusable char-
acters. Figure 2 shows a partial list of letters similar to the letter ‘p’ taken from
this list.
Fig. 2. Visually Confusable characters for ‘p’ from the Unicode List of Confusables
Evaluation Dataset. We use PAN-2015 evaluation lab [11] dataset submission
by Palkovskii and Belov [10] which is based on the PAN-2013 training dataset
with characters in the suspicious documents replaced with homoglyphs. This
dataset consists of 5185 document pairs divided into five categories of ‘no pla-
giarism’, ‘no obfuscation’, ‘translation’, ‘random’ and ‘summary’ obfuscation.
3.2 Approaches
Approach 1: Unicode Confusables. In our first approach (shown in Figure
3), we find and replace every non-ASCII character in the suspicious documents
with the corresponding visually matching character from the list of confusable
characters. This process replaces homoglyphs in the text of the suspicious doc-
uments with visually similar ASCII characters. The resulting suspicious docu-
ments can then be compared with the source documents for similarity. In our
approach we use word trigram similarity as the seeding strategy, with merging
and filtering to discard small matches as false positives [2].
        Suspicious Documents             Source Documents 
 
                 Report Similarity 
Use the list of confusables 
to replace homoglyphs 
 
Apply word trigram similarity 
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Fig. 3. Block Diagram for Plagiarism Detection using the List of Confusables
Approach 2: Normalized Hamming Distance. Our second approach uses
normalized hamming distance as an approximate string matching technique.
Such techniques are well-suited for this task since homoglyph substitution may
partially change the structure of a word. Hamming Distance (when applied to
strings of characters) detects the number of substitutions (replacements) from
one string into another by finding the number of positions where the two strings
differ [9]. We use a similarity score (simh) computed using normalized hamming
distance, defined between two words w1, w2 of equal length as:
simh(w1, w2) = 1− Number of substitutions(w1, w2)/length(w1).
Compared to other approximate string similarity measures, normalized ham-
ming distance has the advantage of significantly reducing the number of false
positives generated. Hamming distance is undefined for strings of unequal length,
(we consider simh = 0 in this case), whereas these strings might be marked as
similar using alternative string similarity techniques, such as character skip gram
matching. For example, simh(play, plays) = 0, while simh(play, play) = 0.75.
Normalized hamming distance similarity (simh) is used to compare each
word in the suspicious document with the words in the source document. If
a pair of words have a value of simh greater than or equal to a particular
threshold, we consider them as similar. The threshold value depends on the
extent of homoglyph substitution in the dataset. For example, if most of the
letters in each word have been replaced by homoglyphs, then a lower threshold
value will be required to match these words.
Using this procedure for approximate matching of words instead of exact
matching, we apply word trigram similarity with merging and filtering (as used
in the list-based approach) to find the plagdet score between the source and sus-
picious documents. We conduct our experiments on the PAN-2015 dataset used
in the list-based approach. Regarding the threshold value of simh for matching
words in our experiments, we do not pre-select a value for this threshold. Instead
we calculate plagdet scores for the entire dataset for a range of values of simh
as shown in Figure 4.
4 Results and Discussion
4.1 Approach 1: Unicode Confusables
Table 1 shows the results of plagiarism detection in terms of Precision, Recall
and Plagdet [11] scores. It can be seen that except for summary obfuscation,
Plagdet scores for all other categories including that for the entire dataset are
moderately high (≥ 0.60). This can be compared with the performance of most
of the PAN approaches from 2012-2014 [11] on this dataset where the reported
Plagdet scores were mostly 0, suggesting a significant improvement.
During the homoglyph replacement phase using the list-based approach, we
observed that a number of replacements were also made for non-Latin charac-
ters in suspicious documents which were not intended as homoglyphs in source
documents. For example, the currency symbol ‘’ was replaced by a ‘c’. This
Table 1. Plagdet-scores using the Homoglyph Replacement Approach
Dataset No Obf. Random Obf. Transl. Obf. Summ. Obf.
Precision 0.772 0.663 0.953 0.781 0.826
Recall 0.727 0.988 0.667 0.643 0.107
Plagdet 0.670 0.717 0.707 0.632 0.150
observation suggests that the proposed approach of using a list of homoglyph-
alphabet pairs to replace characters may not work well when the source text
contains a large number of foreign characters, since these might be converted
to ASCII characters in the substitution phase. However, the approach can be
improved by searching through the source documents to distinguish homoglyphs
from true source non-Latin characters, at the cost of increased computation time.
Fig. 4. Plagdet scores for Plagiarism Detection
using Normalized Hamming Distance Similarity
Category Plagdet
Entire Dataset 0.644
No Obfuscation 0.662
Random Obf. 0.688
Translate. Obf. 0.626
Summary Obf. 0.142
Table 2. Plagdet scores for
the case when simh = 0.450
4.2 Approach 2: Normalized Hamming Distance
Figure 4 shows Precision, Recall and Plagdet scores for various values of simh
threshold. It can be seen that a threshold value for simh ≈ 0.45 is giving the
highest Plagdet score of 0.644. Table 2 gives Plagdet scores for each category of
plagiarism in the dataset for a threshold value of 0.45. Similar to Table 1, we
observe that except for summary obfuscation, most of these values are moder-
ately high (≥ 0.6). Although the scores in Table 1 are somewhat higher than
those in Table 2, the differences are small enough to consider performance of
the approaches to be similar for detecting plagiarism in homoglyph obfuscated
texts. From Figure 4 we observe that a careful selection of threshold value for
simh is important. The Plagdet score rapidly decreases after simh = 0.5 since
higher threshold values increase the number of true matches being rejected. For
large datasets, this problem can alleviated by first applying the approach on a
smaller collection of training documents to obtain a suitable initial estimate for
the threshold value.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
The development of techniques for automated plagiarism detection continues
to be an active area of research. In this work we presented two approaches for
plagiarism detection in homoglyph obfuscated texts which perform equally well
for plagiarism detection. One approach utilizes the Unicode list of confusables
to replace homoglyphs with visually identical letters; the other approach uses a
similarity score computed using normalized hamming distance. For future work,
improvised versions of these approaches can be incorporated into a set of ap-
proaches for detecting multiple forms of technical disguise.
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